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Speeches
Bargaining, Race, and Globalization:
How Baseball and Other Sports Mirror
Collective Bargaining, Law, and Life†
By WILLIAM B. GOULD IV*
IT IS AN HONOR and pleasure to speak here and to give the Ninth
Annual Pemberton Lecture on the centennial of the University of San
Francisco School of Law.1 I have enjoyed my association with this law
school for many years and am particularly proud of Professor Maria
† This article is based on the Ninth Annual Pemberton Lecture, held on April 4,
2013.
* Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford Law School; Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Board, 1994–98; member of the National Academy of
Arbitrators since 1970; expert witness for the National Hockey League in 2005–07 in Orca
Bay Limited Partnership, [2007] B.C.L.R.B. No. B172/2007, ¶¶ 67–68 (July 31, 2007),
available at http://www.lrb.bc.ca/decisions/B172$2007.pdf -and- expert witness for the
National Hockey League in Colby Armstrong et al. & National Hockey League Players
Ass’n v. Club de Hockey Canadien, Inc. & NHL, No. CM-2012-4431 (2012) -and- expert
witness for retirees in Eller v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 872 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.
Minn. 2012); occasional Stanford baseball broadcaster since 1988; freelance baseball
newspaper journalist since 1986; and Boston Red Sox fan since 1946. As Board Chairman,
the author cast the deciding vote in the 1994–95 baseball strike in favor of authorizing the
Board to pursue the injunction granted in Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player
Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
This brought to conclusion the last in a series of baseball strikes and lockouts covering
three decades. The parties then negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in November
1996.
The author is grateful to Eric Weitz, Stanford Law School 2014, and Veronica Francis,
University of San Francisco 2015, for their valuable research assistance. Of course, I take
full responsibility for any errors or deficiencies in this article.
1. The University of San Francisco created the annual Jack Pemberton Lecture on
Workplace Justice in 2005. See William B. Gould IV, A Tribute to Professor John De. J.
Pemberton, Jr. at the Commencement of the Jack Pemberton Lecture on Workplace Justice, 29 U.S.F. L.
REV. 693 (2005). The lecture features nationally recognized labor and employment law
scholars and focuses on emerging workplace issues with students, alumni, and practition-
ers. Annual Jack Pemberton Lecture on Workplace Justice, U.S.F. SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.
usfca.edu/law/pembertonlectures/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
1
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Ontiveros whom Stanford Law School counts as its own for her distin-
guished graduate degree at Stanford.
The honor is particularly important to me given my close friend-
ship and professional working relationship with Jack Pemberton in
the 1970s and early 1980s. He was my valued co-counsel in employ-
ment discrimination class actions2 as well as co-teacher for our em-
ployment discrimination seminar alternating between Stanford and
USF week by week. Beginning with Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission hearings in 1971, we became close personal friends inter-
ested in collective bargaining as well as racial issues and discrimina-
tion cases (two of today’s subjects), though I daresay Professor
Pemberton had little interest in sports—but he kept up, I am told, a
very good tennis game.
Though today’s subject is sports generally, as well as labor and
race, my focus is disproportionately weighted toward baseball and is-
sues relating to it, particularly given the timing of the lecture with this
new season. For April 2013 marks the celebration of two out of three
world championships (perhaps properly characterized as national,
given the fact they involve only the United States and Canada) for the
San Francisco Giants, a team which along with my own Boston Red
Sox, are two clubs that have won twice in this still relatively new cen-
tury.3 The Oakland Athletics, still winners of what has been character-
ized as their game of “moneyball,”4 defend a Western Division
championship and, in keeping with the idea of spring and new begin-
nings, there will be an ever so brief exposure to exciting new twenty-
2. See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev’d in
part, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.
1975), vacated, Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 431 U.S. 951 (1977), remanded to the Sixth
Circuit in light of Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
Jones v. Pac. Intermountain Express, 536 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Truck-
ing Emp’rs, Inc., 561 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Black Musicians of Pittsburgh v. Local 60-
471, Am. Fed’n of Musicians, 375 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
3. Since this lecture was delivered in April, the Red Sox have won their third world
championship in the past decade. David Waldstein, Monster Achievement: Red Sox Clinch First
Title at Fenway Since 1918, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at B13; Dan Shaughnessy, Tested and
Triumphant, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2013, at Y1; David Waldstein, In Baseball’s Time Ma-
chine, 21st Century Belongs to the Red Sox, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2013, at Y1.
4. MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003) (por-
traying a limited and somewhat misleading examination of the Oakland Athletics’ ap-
proach to being a competitive baseball team despite a lack of financial revenue).
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two-year-old rookie Jackie Bradley, Jr. who may yet return to patrol the
left or centerfield territory of Fenway Park.5
Nearly thirty years ago the ex-Boston Red Sox second-string
catcher Roy Partee gave me a photo of the infamous dash to home
plate by Enos Slaughter in the seventh game of the 1946 World Series,
which allowed the St. Louis Cardinals to prevail four games to three,
allowing for the Cardinals to win the World Series in the final game.6
The photo is signed by all in it, and for years I was intrigued by the
identity of one individual excluded from it just a few feet away down
the third base line, e.g., the Cardinals’s hot corner coach, Mike Gon-
zalez, a man with a Latin name at the time of the last game of the
twentieth century’s color bar.7
The following spring Jackie Robinson broke that century’s color
bar,8 though contrary to much public belief, he was not the first black
player in organized baseball. Approximately thirty-three black players
were part of “white baseball” between 1878 and the close of that cen-
tury, three standouts being Frank Grant, John “Bud” Fowler, and
Moses Fleetwood Walker, who were three of the more well-known
players9 before Jim Crow and “separate but equal”10 sealed the door to
black players in the 1890s.
But in the twentieth century with the advent of some Latin play-
ers, particularly from baseball-dominant and baseball-crazy Cuba
(where the game has been played nearly as long as in the United
5. Zach Schonbrun, Boston’s Center Fielder of the Future Gets a Second Chance at Now, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2013, at SP3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sports/
baseball/bostons-center-fielder-of-future-gets-a-second-chance-at-now.html.
6. George Vecsey, John Pesky: The Man Who Held the Ball, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/23/sports/baseball/23vecsey.html. As second base-
man Bobby Doerr told me, Slaughter scored because Leon Culberson, subbing for Do-
minic DiMaggio, was tardy in retrieving Harry Walker’s hit. Telephone interview with
Bobby Doerr, former Major League Baseball second baseman and coach (Oct. 14, 2009).
7. The 1946 season was extraordinarily memorable and is chronicled in FREDERICK
TURNER, WHEN THE BOYS CAME BACK: BASEBALL AND 1946 (1996). See also ROBERT WEIN-
TRAUB, THE VICTORY SEASON: THE END OF WORLD WAR II AND THE BIRTH OF BASEBALL’S
GOLDEN AGE (2013). Likewise, the author has discussed the 1946 season in WILLIAM B.
GOULD IV, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL: LABOR RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF PROSPEROUS TUR-
MOIL 25–37 (2011) [hereinafter GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL].
8. JULES TYGIEL, JACKIE ROBINSON AND HIS LEGACY (1984); ARNOLD RAMPERSAD, JACKIE
ROBINSON: A BIOGRAPHY 158–67 (1998); William B. Gould IV, Black Player Jackie Robinson’s
Influence Still Noticeable Today, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 15, 2007, at 5P.
9. RICK SWAINE, THE INTEGRATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL: A TEAM BY TEAM HIS-
TORY 12 (McFarland 2009).
10. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Separate but equal was undercut in
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954), and was later overruled in Browder v.
Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff’d, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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States11) the situation took on added complexity. Cuba, from whence
Mike Gonzalez hailed, produced
at least one unheralded ebony-skinned Cincinnati pitcher of Cu-
ban birth (Tommy de la Cruz) [who preceded] Robinson in cross-
ing baseball’s twentieth-century racial barriers during the 1944
National League season. Even before [Branch] Rickey’s plan had
materialized in 1945 and 1946, other Cubans (Jack Calvo and Jose´
Acosta with the 1920s Senators) and Puerto Ricans (Hi Bithorn
with the 1942–1944 Cubs and perhaps Luı´s Olmo with the Dodgers
from 1943 to 1945) had also slipped behind the racial barriers qui-
etly and almost unnoticed.12
Cuban, Adolfo “Dolf” Luque, was sufficiently light-skinned to pass
the color barrier,13 as others presumably did by characterizing them-
selves as American Indians, in my judgment—and Luque “stood su-
preme as one of the most feared hurlers in baseball.”14 Present for the
1919 Black Sox World Series scandal, and a survivor of both the Ty
Cobb dead-ball era as well as the beginnings of Babe Ruth’s
supremacy in the long-ball era, Luque won nearly 200 games over a
two-decade major league career, going 27–8 with a 1.93 ERA in
1923.15 His alleged aggressiveness on the field seemed to be mirrored
by pitcher Samuel Deduno of the Dominican Republic in the 2013
World Baseball Classic as he taunted San Francisco centerfielder A´n-
gel Paga´n subsequent to fanning him with two on and two out in the
critical fifth inning of the championship game between the Domini-
can Republic and Puerto Rico here in San Francisco.16 And before
Robinson, Branch Rickey apparently considered signing dark-skinned
Cuban, Silvio Garcı´a17—the pre-1947 twentieth century test for Latin
Americans being skin complexion rather than racial identity. Thus
11. For in-depth examinations of the history of baseball in Cuba, see ROBERTO GONZA´-
LEZ ECHEVARRI´A, THE PRIDE OF HAVANA: A HISTORY OF CUBAN BASEBALL (1999), and PETER
C. BJARKMAN, HISTORY OF CUBAN BASEBALL, 1864–2006 (2007).
12. PETER C. BJARKMAN, BASEBALL WITH A LATIN BEAT: A HISTORY OF THE LATIN AMERI-
CAN GAME 13–14 (1994).
13. The all-black Cuban Giants spoke an infield chatter gibberish they hoped would
avoid their identification as black Americans. See Alvin Harlow, Unrecognized Stars, ESQUIRE,
Sept. 1938, at 75 (quoting former Cuban Giants player Sol White).
14. BJARKMAN, supra note 12, at 14.
15. MLB Player Stats of Dolf Luque, MLB.COM, http://reds.mlb.com/team/player.
jsp?player_id=118012&c_id=cin#gameType=‘R’&sectionType=career&statType=2&season=
2013&level=‘ALL’’ (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
16. Tom Goldman, Dominican Republic Wins World Baseball Classic (NPR News radio
broadcast Mar. 20, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/03/20/174812890/do-
minican-republic-wins-world-baseball-classic.
17. ECHEVARRI´A, supra note 11, at 262.
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did the often-nuanced interplay between race and globalization
emerge long before the past quarter-century of globalization.
And what followed Robinson, of course, was the advent of a num-
ber of black superstars like Larry Doby (who was the first in the Ameri-
can League, following Robinson by just a few weeks), Roy Campanella,
Don Newcombe, Monte Irvin, Satchel Paige (then somewhere beyond
forty years old and essentially limited to his effective “hesitation
pitch”),18 the great Willie Mays, as well as black Latins like Orestes
“Minnie” Min˜oso. In those years, the few black players in the majors
out-hit whites by more than twenty points.19 This became the era
which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here in San Fran-
cisco, speaking through Judge Stephen Reinhardt, characterized as
“the racist culture that permeated baseball from the 1940’s through
[the] early 1970’s [which] led to an unwritten quota of two black play-
ers per [MLB] team after the color barrier was broken, and those two
players were usually . . . of outstanding talent.”20 Soon thereafter, in
the 1970s, blacks went to 30% of the player universe21—though black
Americans constituted only approximately 17–18% of the total com-
plement—and then, after much controversy, rounding out with Los
Angeles Dodger Al Campanis’s controversial comments about blacks
not possessing the necessities to be a manager,22 Frank Robinson
broke that barrier with the Cleveland Indians in 1975.23
18. See LARRY TYE, SATCHEL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN LEGEND 147, 213, 271
(2009).
19. See Gerald W. Scully, Economic Discrimination in Professional Sports, 38 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 67, 71 (1973).
20. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 756 n.12 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omit-
ted); see also N. Jeremi Duru, Exploring Jethroe’s Injustice: The Impact of an Ex-Ballplayer’s Legal
Quest for a Pension on the Movement for Restorative Racial Justice, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 793, 799
(2008).
21. Ann Killion, Baseball Struggles to Reach Black America, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 17, 2013),
http://www.sfgate.com/sports/article/Baseball-struggles-to-reach-black-America-4360778.
php.
22. Richard L. Harris, For Campanis, a Night that Lived in Infamy, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5,
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/05/sports/sp-campanis5; see also William B.
Gould IV, Time for Affirmative Action: Baseball Urged to Seek Out, Train Blacks as Managers and
Executives, S.F. CHRON., July 6, 1986, at C8 [hereinafter Gould, Time for Affirmative Action]
(quoting Campanis, to the same effect, prior to his well-publicized April 1987 interview
with Ted Koppel).
23. Gould, Time for Affirmative Action, supra note 22; cf. N. JEREMI DURU, ADVANCING
THE BALL: RACE, REFORMATION, AND THE QUEST FOR EQUAL COACHING OPPORTUNITY IN THE
NFL 176 n.2 (2011).
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Then began the great decline of African-American baseball play-
ers,24 professionally as well as in the so-called amateur ranks—a phe-
nomenon in sharp contrast to the rise of blacks in football and
basketball. Indeed, it has been noted that the San Francisco Giants,
once an employer of Willie Mays and Monte Irvin,25 in 2013 do not
have one black American player on the roster or in camp.26
Baseball, the last of the major sports to have a black manager
(Bill Russell was the first in any of the major sports, becoming Boston
Celtics head coach in 1966) and one which continues to lag in the
employment of minorities at the so-called steppingstone positions of
bench and third base coach,27 has seen a dwindling number of players
on the field. Indeed, in the 2013 World Series only one (Quentin
Berry of the Red Sox) of the fifty roster players was black.28 The al-
leged reasons for this are numerous and frequently debated.29
A leading baseball executive has said that the “decline of black
children playing baseball [is] the inability to get instant gratification
in baseball; these kids think they can come out of high school and go
right to the pros in basketball and football.”30 But this seems both
stereotypical and to ignore the fact that, in football anyway, one can-
not go directly to the pros from high school, as is possible in baseball
under the Second Circuit’s ruling in Clarett v. National Football
24. Steve Treder, The Persistent Color Line: Specific Instances of Racial Preference in Major
League Player Evaluation Decisions After 1947, 10 NINE 1, 3, 6, 27 (2001).
25. Andrew Baggarly, Extra Baggs: Giants Only Club with No African-Americans, etc., CSN
BAY AREA (Feb. 26, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.csnbayarea.com/blog/andrew-baggarly/
extra-baggs-giants-only-club-no-african-americans-etc; see also John Shea, Why Robinson
Turned Down the Giants, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/giants/shea/
article/Why-Robinson-turned-down-Giants-4440239.php. The Giants purchased Robinson
from the Dodgers in 1958, when he was near the end—he immediately retired. Shea, supra.
26. Baggarly, supra note 25.
27. As of 2010, 67% of first-base coaches were minorities compared to just 23% of
third-base coaches. Michael S. Schmidt & Andrew Keh, Baseball’s Praised Diversity Is Stranded
at First Base, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at B13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
08/12/sports/baseball/12baseball.html?_r=0.
28. Bill Shaikin, In the Year of ‘42,’ a World Series with One African-American Player, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2013, available at http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-world-
series-bud-selig-african-american-player-20131026,0,117671.story#axzz2jWpdrj00; William
C. Rhoden, Jackie Robinson’s Legacy Recedes on Baseball Rosters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, at
B12.
29. William B. Gould IV, On Blacks and Baseball, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2006, at A13;
William B. Gould IV, A Fan’s Complaint: Red Sox Shortchange Blacks, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14,
1986, at 19.
30. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 249 (internal quotations
omitted).
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League.31 Indeed, the instant gratification argument relies upon the
idea that in baseball, except for players like first baseman John Olerud
of Washington State or twirler Mike Leake of Arizona State, an ap-
prenticeship in the minor leagues of some duration must be served
prior to promotion to the majors even after college. In basketball,
where at one time the jump could be made from high school to the
National Basketball Association immediately,32 one year in college or
the equivalent time period must precede advancement,33 though the
recent emergence of the developmental league, as well as European
and Chinese basketball, creates a minor league apprenticeship which
has no analogue in football.
Second, in my view there are a number of reasons for the substan-
tial decline of black players in baseball. It is noticeable that, not only
are facilities and equipment expensive and more easily available in the
suburbs, but also even the existence of a batting cage is entirely un-
available in some of the major cities where blacks are more likely to
reside.34 Travel teams have become the training ground for young
baseball players as early as eight, nine, or ten years old who aspire to
play high school, college, and professional ball down the road.35
Third, and arguably the second cousin of the instant gratification ar-
gument, there is the oft-cited reason of the disproportionate absence
of fathers in black households.36 But that hardly seems to have af-
fected football and basketball.
31. 369 F.3d 124, 139–41 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding NFL’s draft eligibility rules re-
quiring players to be three full college football seasons removed from high school).
32. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1206 (1971) (reinstating prelim-
inary injunction preventing league from taking sanctions against team for signing a player
less than four years after graduating from high school).
33. NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, CBA 101: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL BASKET-
BALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 13 (2010), available at http://www.nba.com/.element/mp3/
2.0/sect/podcastmp3/PDF/CBA101.pdf. Under the current NBA-NBPA collective bar-
gaining agreement, “U.S. players must . . . be at least one year removed from high school”
to be eligible for the NBA draft. Id.
34. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 252.
35. Tim Keown, Why African Americans Don’t Play Pro Baseball, ESPN, http://espn.go.
com/mlb/story/_/id/9186117/why-african-americans-play-pro-baseball (last updated Apr.
19, 2013).
36. Dexter Rogers, Bob Costas on Being Commissioner, Changes Major League Baseball
Needs and Race, HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dexter-
rogers/bob-costas-on-being-commi_b_3303551.html. In addition to discussing the expense
of baseball and the lack of scholarships available, Costas mentions, “[b]aseball tends to be
a father son game—at least when a kid is first introduced to it. As we know, in certain
portions of the black community, fatherlessness is a problem that goes well beyond base-
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The role of colleges, previously unimportant in baseball where, in
contrast to football and basketball, the professional game antedates
and dwarfs the rise of college play,37 is surely a factor. In the past
thirty years more than 50% of the players filling the professional ranks
have attended college.38 Of course, it will be said that football and
basketball receive more attention in the black community than does
baseball. But the college statistics demonstrate that this reasoning is
superficial and circular:
The standard argument is that diversity in the college game suffers
because of baseball’s dwindling popularity among young African
Americans. But this gives an incomplete picture. A lower percent-
age of African Americans participate in college baseball than cross-
country, fencing, soccer, volleyball and wrestling. These sports
don’t exactly compete with basketball or football for dominance in
black neighborhoods. They don’t exactly match baseball’s level of
black participation on the professional stage, either.39
King football, the great revenue-producer, in Division I possesses
eighty-five full-time scholarships—in contrast to baseball, where the
number is 11.7 and rarely is a full-scholarship given to any player.40 In
contrast, baseball scholarships “must be divided up like morsels
among the entire roster. Players are expected to cover the rest.”41 This
is a problem exacerbated by the recruitment of out-of-state students
by public universities and the college baseball dominance of some pri-
vate universities like Rice, Miami, and Stanford, which now has two
black players on its roster (but in some years past has had none). All
of “this translates to a huge tuition bill that’s hard for anybody but the
most well-heeled to pay, whatever color they are.”42
ball, but probably is a factor when it comes to declining baseball participation among black
youth.” Id.
37. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 12–13.
38. However, few probably graduate, in substantial part, because players become eligi-
ble to contract with professional teams after their junior year.
39. Gregory Ruehlmann, The Incredibly White College World Series, THE ROOT (June 20,
2008), http://www.theroot.com/views/incredibly-white-college-world-series.
40. See Bob Nightengale, MLB Hopes to Invigorate African-American Participation, USA
TODAY SPORTS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2013/04/10/
mlb-bud-selig-creates-diversity-task-force/2071305/. Compare Football Recruiting, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/Test/Issues/Recruiting/Football+
Recruiting (last updated Mar. 9, 2012), with Dave Pickle, In the News: March 24, NCAA
INSIDER BLOG (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/blog/2011/03/in-the-news-march-
24/.
41. Ruehlmann, supra note 39; see also Telephone interview with Mark Marquess, Stan-
ford baseball, (Dec. 7, 2004).
42. Ruehlmann, supra note 39.
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The average black youngster may be drawn away, blacks consti-
tute 4.1% of all college baseball players, a number which has actually
declined in the past decade.43 The comparable figure in football is
34.5% and in basketball, where thirteen scholarships are available, the
comparable number is 45.6%.44 Moreover, only 0.5% of college base-
ball coaches are black, Tony Gwynn at San Diego State standing as a
lonely exception that proves the rule. True, black players in football
and basketball are more likely to play for white coaches in that sport
as well, but the presence of a critical mass of players may diminish any
reticence attached with the coaching racial composition.45
There is a particular irony in the statistical data relating to the
Southeastern Conference, where baseball-dominant Louisiana State
University and the University of Florida (in a conference which barred
black players altogether until the 1970s) reside in states where the
black population is at its highest and where the percentage of blacks
in basketball and football is more than 70% at the University of Ala-
bama, University of Georgia, University of South Carolina, University
of Mississippi, Mississippi State University, and the University of Ten-
nessee.46 The percentage difference between blacks in the undergrad-
uate student body and on these revenue-generating sports teams is
dramatic, going from a 63% difference at the University of Florida all
43. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 1999–2000 — 2009–10 NCAA STUDENT-ATH-
LETE RACE/ETHNICITY REPORT 111 (2010).
44. Id. at 112, 115.
45. Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (finding lower
court erred in comparing racial composition of teacher workforce with that of the student
population); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (rejecting the so-
called role model theory by stating “[t]here are numerous explanations for a disparity
between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many
of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. In fact, there is no apparent
connection between the two groups”). I am of the view that the best position in this area
has been set forth by Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion in Fisher v. Univ. of Texas,
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2432–34 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]hose that candidly disclose
their consideration of race [are] preferable to those that conceal it.”) (internal quotations
omitted). See also Ricci v. DeStafano, 557 U.S. 557, 608, 644 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (disagreeing with the majority’s finding that “a city in which African–Americans and
Hispanics account for nearly 60 percent of the population, must today be served—as it was
in the days of undisguised discrimination—by a fire department in which members of ra-
cial and ethnic minorities are rarely seen in command positions”).
46. SHAUN R. HARPER, COLLIN D. WILLIAMS, JR. & HORATIO W. BLACKMAN, CTR. FOR
THE STUDY OF RACE AND EQUITY IN EDUC., UNIV. OF PENN. GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., BLACK
MALE STUDENT-ATHLETES AND RACIAL INEQUITIES IN NCAA DIVISION I COLLEGE SPORTS 14
(2013).
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the way up to 73% at the University of Mississippi.47 Baseball statistics
are not remotely comparable.
And the figures relating to the absence of blacks are even more
dramatic at the elite level where teams in the College World Series
(“CWS”) often do not have any black players at all.48 Thus, “NCAA
baseball has a race problem that dwarfs anything in the major
leagues.”49 All of this means that one of the main avenues50 to profes-
sional baseball is shut down for black players through raw econom-
ics.51 Major League Baseball has appropriately engaged in discussions
in recent years about providing financial aid to the NCAA to remedy
this,52 but to date nothing has happened and at present I fear nothing
will happen. Of course, there remains the elephant in the room in this
47. Id.
48. E.g., Ruehlmann, supra note 39 (noting that three of eight teams in the 2008 CWS
had no black players); Pat Borzi, Black Players Often Stand Alone in College Baseball, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2005, at D5 (noting that the four finalists in the 2005 CWS had a total of
four black players and one team had none); Three CWS Teams Have No Black Players, ESPN
(June 25, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2094459 (noting that
three teams in the 2005 CWS had no black players).
49. Ruehlmann, supra note 39.
50. In 2012, Baseball America found that 54% of drafted players on major league
forty-man rosters came from four-year colleges. See Conor Glassey, MLB 40-Man Roster Anal-
ysis, BASEBALL AMERICA (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/majors/
season-preview/2012/2613177.html; GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at
257.
51. Bob Cook, Baseball’s Lack of Black Players Reflects Flawed U.S. Development System,
FORBES (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2013/04/10/baseballs-
lack-of-black-players-reflects-flawed-u-s-youth-development-system/ (“[Sports like baseball]
generally require their participants to have families with the luxury of money to spend
thousands of dollars on equipment each year and the luxury of time to be able to tag along
during the extensive travel schedule those teams require, a process that begins when play-
ers still haven’t reached double digits in age. They also require those families to live in
communities where there is access to such programs.”); see also id. (“Major League Base-
ball, if it’s serious about wanting to increase African-American player development, will
have to do more than a few promotional programs here and there. It will have to engage in
some level of what it’s doing in Latin America for urban America. In other words, spend a
ton of money to even the playing field, no pun intended, between black kids and their
richer, whiter counterparts.”); Tim Keown, What the MLB Committee Will Find, ESPN (Apr.
19, 2013), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/9186117/why-african-americans-play-pro-
baseball (“The committee members need to see the industry of youth baseball for what it
has become: A business enterprise designed to exclude those without the means and mo-
bility to participate. Over the past 15 to 20 years, the proliferation of pay-for-play teams in
youth baseball—and the parallel proliferation of parents willing to pay for them and
coaches willing to cash their checks—has had more of an impact on African-American
participation than anything another sport has to offer.”).
52. See Andy Gardiner, NCAA, MLB Ponder Partnership on Additional Scholarships, USA
TODAY (May 15, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/baseball/story/
2012-05-15/ncaa-mlb-ponder-partnership-on-scholarships/54977248/1.
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entire discussion, i.e., the professionalization of so-called amateur ath-
letics and the question of whether college athletes ought to be consid-
ered employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act.53 But in the confines of the system as it currently is, baseball,
along with the NCAA, needs to step up to the plate so that poor or
less-affluent kids of all races have an opportunity to benefit from avail-
able scholarships, something that the NCAA appears unwilling to do
because of the privileged position of the revenue-producing sports in
its hierarchy.54
Baseball has taken a number of steps to address this issue through
the establishment of a so-called RBI (Reviving Baseball in Inner Cit-
ies) program, of which Carl Crawford, Coco Crisp, Jimmy Rollins, CC
Sabathia, and Dontrelle Willis are some of the most prominent
alumni.55 A similar program, aimed at the community, has been insti-
tuted in the form of the Major League Baseball Urban Youth Academy
in Compton, California. An additional facility has been opened in
Houston, Texas. It may be that these programs will bear fruit and re-
verse the decline at some point in the future. At present there is no
sign of this.56
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick,
The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71 (2006);
Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.theatlan-
tic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/; Joe Nocera,
Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
see also Boston Medical Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999) (determining that interns and
residents are employees); William B. Gould IV, Globalization in Collective Bargaining, Baseball,
and Matsuzaka: Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 283
(2007) [hereinafter Gould, Globalization in Collective Bargaining].
54. Mike Axisa, MLB Creating Committee to Study Decline in African-American Players, CBS
SPORTS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/blog/eye-on-baseball/22045063/
mlb-creating-committee-to-study-decline-of-africanamerican-player (“I think at least part of
the reason the number of African-Americans in baseball has declined has to do with the
lack of baseball scholarships colleges can offer. NCAA Division I schools are allowed only
11.7 baseball scholarships, and may fund fewer. Other sports like football (85 scholarships
in the FBS) and basketball (13 in Division I) can offer more, which may be luring young
athletes—of all races, not just African-Americans—away from the diamond.”).
55. But see Phil Taylor, In Oakland and Cities Across the Country, Baseball a Forgotten Game,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 17, 2013), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/mlb/news/
20130417/baseball-diversity/.
56. Nick Cafardo, MLB Still Lacks Interest from African-Americans, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
14, 2013, at C9 (“The RBI program has been a noble undertaking. RBI has seen more than
200 of its kids drafted to major league teams. But it hasn’t created that interest of a kid
gathering up his pals and heading over the park for a pickup game, like Willie Mays, Hank
Aaron, and Ernie Banks etc. used to do. Nowadays, if it’s not organized or structured, it
usually doesn’t happen.”).
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And there is another factor that must be taken into account. This
is the development of globalization, which, similar to its advent in the
general economy,57 contains both its positive and negative aspects.
I. The Jurisprudence of Title IX and Its Potential
Applicability to Blacks in College Baseball
Here, Title IX, with regard to the NCAA, is instructive. The stat-
ute was designed to combat sex-based discrimination in education ad-
missions but, notwithstanding the fact that there appeared to be little
discussion of intercollegiate athletics in the legislative history,58 Sena-
tor Birch Bayh stated that the exceptions to discriminatory prohibi-
tions were narrow, i.e., “[Title IX is not designed to] mandate the
desegregation of football fields.”59 The proposed Tower Amendment
provided for a revenue-based exemption to the sex discrimination
prohibition and was subsequently rejected,60 but Congress replaced it
with another amendment in late 1974, the Javits Amendment, which
directed the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (“HEW”) to prepare regulations regarding “intercollegiate
athletic [activities providing for] reasonable provisions considering
the nature of particular sports.”61 Subsequent attempts to exempt rev-
enue-producing sports were introduced between 1974 and 1976, but
they all failed.62 The Secretary of HEW noted that, while “revenue
production could not justify disparity in average per capita expendi-
ture between men and women,” there were nonetheless differences
57. Cf. ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, GLOBALIZATION AND LABOR CONDITIONS: WORKING CONDI-
TIONS AND WORKER RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 7 (2006) (examining how mechanisms of
globalization alter working conditions and labor rights). See generally INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Robert J. Flanagan, William B.
Gould IV eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (examining  current regulations and standards,
along with recent proposals and mechanisms to compel developing countries to adopt
labor standards).
58. See, e.g., Charles Spitz, Note, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics as Mandated by
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972: Fair or Foul?, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 621,
625–26 (1997).
59. Id. at 626 n.22 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. S5807 (1972)).
60. See id. at 627, 627 n.26; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 n.6 (1st Cir.
1993).
61. Spitz, supra note 58, at 627 n.30 (quoting The Education Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974)).
62. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 11 n.36 (1992); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512, 532 n.22, 533 n.24 (1982) (noting amendments aimed at limiting Title IX’s applicabil-
ity to athletics).
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that could be tolerated because of the high expenditures required, for
instance, for “expensive protective equipment.”63
As a matter of Title IX law, it seems that equality is not required
in each sport but rather in treatment overall,64 and thus, even assum-
ing the law applied to race as well as sex, a violation could not be
made out because of the unfair treatment of blacks and other poor
players, so long as the programs such as football and basketball pro-
duce large numbers of black athletes. It seems to me nonetheless that
given the relevance of lack of interest on the part of students to sports
opportunities, the fact that black, minority, and poor baseball players
may be diverted from that sport by superior benefits in others, is a
matter to which policymakers ought to attend as part of an attempt to
remedy the absence of blacks in college baseball—and thus the rela-
tive absence of blacks in professional baseball.
II. Globalization
The backdrop for these developments is globalization, which, as
we have seen, had already been developing prior to Robinson in 1947.
At the time of the embargo of Cuba in 1961, ninety-six Cubans and
twelve Dominicans had played in Major League Baseball.65 After more
than a half-century the Cubans keep coming—notwithstanding the le-
63. Office of Civil Rights, Office of the Secretary, HEW, Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71421
(1979). But see Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding pay
disparities between coaches of men’s and women’s basketball teams in part based on the
claim that the men’s team generated much more revenue and thus warranted a higher-
paid coach); Bartges v. Univ. of N.C. at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1995),
aff’d, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
64. See, e.g., Kelley v. Bd. of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting dis-
crimination allegation brought by members of men’s swimming program that was cut by
the University of Illinois when the women’s swimming program and other men’s sports
were not).
Requiring parallel teams would certainly have been the simplest method of ensur-
ing equality of opportunity—and plaintiffs would doubtless have preferred this
approach since, had it been adopted, the men’s swimming program would likely
have been saved. It was not unreasonable, however, for the agency to reject this
course of action. Requiring parallel teams is a rigid approach that denies schools
the flexibility to respond to the differing athletic interests of men and women. It
was perfectly acceptable, therefore, for the agency to chart a different course and
adopt an enforcement scheme that measures compliance by analyzing how a
school has allocated its various athletic resources.
Id.
65. Mark Kurlansky, Cuba’s Major-League Cachet, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303720604575170171909416204.html.
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gal prohibitions—at least sixty defectors have played in the majors.66
But since the Cuban embargo the numbers have shifted dramatically
toward the Dominican Republic.67
In the wake of free agency, baseball decided to fight so as to limit
or reverse Peter Seitz’s 1975 award providing that players were free to
sign with another club subsequent to the expiration of the option year
at the end of their individual contract68 and the 1976 collective bar-
gaining agreement which followed it.69 But a near thirty years’ war,70
culminating in the mother of all strikes in 1994–95, which produced
66. Id.; see also Rachel D. Solomon, Note, Cuban Baseball Players, the Unlucky Ones:
United States-Cuban Professional Baseball Relations Should Be an Integral Part of the United States-
Cuba Relationship, 101 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 153, 157 (2011) (noting impact of legislation on
Cuban defectors); Walter T. Champion & Danyahel Norris, Why Not Row to the Bahamas
Instead of Miami?: The Conundrum That Awaits Cuban Elite Baseball Players Who Seek Asylum and
the Economic Nirvana of Free Agency, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 219, 231–32 (2009) (explaining
incentive to defect in light of MLB “loophole” rules); Matthew J. Frankel, Note, Major
League Problems: Baseball’s Broken System of Cuban Defection, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 383,
408 n.218 (2005); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Baseball Diplomacy, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
473, 479–85 (2002) (explaining the hiring of Cuban defectors and focusing on the MLB
rules for hiring individual players from Cuba once they arrive in the United States); Scott
M. Cwiertny, Note, The Need for a Worldwide Draft: Major League Baseball and Its Relationship
with the Cuban Embargo and United States Foreign Policy, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 391, 411–21
(2000) (examining the evolution of MLB rules, including the MLB “loophole,” regarding
the recruiting and signing of Cuban baseball players). More recently, the MLB has made it
increasingly difficult to sign Cuban defectors. Ben Badler, MLB Delays Cuban Signings, BASE-
BALL AMERICA, Sept. 17–Oct. 1, 2013, at 3 (on file with author); cf. Ben Badler, Slugging First
Baseman Abreu Leaves Cuba, BASEBALL AMERICA, Sept. 3–17, 2013, at 19 (on file with author)
(acknowledging that despite increasing difficulty of signing, Jose Abreu, a premiere offen-
sive Cuban player, has left Cuba to try to sign with a major league team). However, Cuba
has begun to lift restrictions on Cuban players who seek to play abroad. See Randal C.
Archibold, Cuba to Let Its Athletes Play Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013, at A2.
67. See discussion infra Part III.
68. Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.).
69. See GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 115 (noting the suggestion
that Miller, long-time executive director of the Major League Baseball Players Association,
initially feared that free agency might lead to an oversupply of players); CHARLES KORR,
THE END OF BASEBALL AS WE KNOW IT: THE PLAYERS UNION, 1960–81 (2002) (discussing
background dynamics), see also MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLGAME: THE INSIDE
STOCK OF THE BASEBALL REVOLUTION (2004).
70. ROBERT C. BERRY, WILLIAM B. GOULD IV ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS 60–73 (1986); William B. Gould IV, The 1994-’95 Strike and National Labor Relations
Board, in REVERSING FIELD: EXAMINING COMMERCIALIZATION, LABOR, GENDER AND RACE IN
21ST CENTURY SPORTS LAW 92–105 (Andre´ Douglas Pond Cummings & Anne Marie Lofaso
eds., 2010); Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould IV, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargain-
ing: Of Players, Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 748–53 (1981) (dis-
cussing Seitz’s 1975 award); William B. Gould IV & Robert C. Berry , Views of Sport: Labor
Trouble Is Brewing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1986, at L_I_S2; see generally William B. Gould IV,
Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 61 (2004) (discussing thirty years of war with particular focus on the 1994–95
strike).
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the elimination of the World Series and ultimately brought the inter-
vention of the National Labor Relations Board prior to Opening Day
1995 to rescind the owners’ unilateral changes on free agency and
salary arbitration, brought the players back to the field and produced
peaceable relationships for two decades and counting.71 Though the
1996 collective bargaining agreement following the end of the
1994–95 strike brought peace, salary escalation continued, and the
search was on for both new revenues and new talent.72 It is not en-
tirely coincidental that Hideo Nomo was able to exploit contractual
loopholes and to become the first Japanese player in the United States
since the 1960s in the immediate wake of the 1994–1995 bitterly
fought strike.73 Today the average annual salary for major league play-
ers is $3.2 million.74
The roots of globalization, however, go far beyond the search for
more inexpensive labor from both the Far East and Latin America,
but also it has involved baseball in a search for new revenues to com-
pensate for ever-increasing labor costs. At its most fundamental level
the sale of hats, shirts, and other paraphernalia in countries such as
Indonesia and Turkey, where baseball is little known, was part of the
MLB strategy. Moreover, the Boston Globe noted that buying an ad-
vertisement behind home plate in Rangers Ballpark in Arlington,
Texas, costs between $120,000 and $160,000 per half inning, if the
advertiser buys an entire season’s worth of ads.75 Buying for just a few
games cost more per half inning, and the same is true in Kansas City,
Seattle, and elsewhere.76 “With the advent of Japanese players of
superstar quality, many Japanese companies began to express interest
71. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 97–112.
72. Baseball’s Revenue Gap: Pennant for Sale? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust Busi-
ness Rights, and Competition of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 106th Cong. 5 (2000) (statement
of Sen. Herbert Kohl), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg74416/
pdf/CHRG-106shrg74416.pdf.
73. Claire Smith, Dodgers Look East, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1995), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/packages/html/sports/year_in_sports/02.13.html.
74. Average Major League Baseball Salary Climbs to $3.2 Million, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/07/sports/la-sp-newswire-2012
1208; cf. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 61–63 (5th ed. 2013)
(noting luxury tax and revenue sharing impacts on players’ salaries).
75. Keith Reid, Sox Have Dice-K but Rivals Reaping Ad Dollars, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25,
2007, http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/redsox/articles/2007/04/25/sox_have_
dice_k_but_rivals_reaping_ad_dollars/.
76. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 259; see also David Jacobson,
The Revenue Model: Why Baseball Is Booming, CBS MONEYWATCH (July 11, 2008), http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-51210671/the-revenue-model-why-baseball-is-booming/.
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in this advertising, aimed as it was at Japanese audiences watching Ma-
jor League Baseball.”77
But much more was involved. Though the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico had been a source in the 1950s and 1960s, it is generally
thought that baseball’s institution of the draft applicable to Puerto
Rico and Canada in 1990 dried up the flow of talent from the Com-
monwealth. As The Economist has noted:
In theory, this should not have affected the number of Puerto Ri-
cans signed, since undrafted players become free agents, who can
sign with any team they wish. But in practice, MLB clubs rarely sign
them; they tell them to go to university and try their luck in the
draft later on. The draft thus forced Puerto Ricans to compete with
Americans for a fixed number of places. Moreover, whereas Puerto
Ricans could previously be signed at age 16, a high-school degree
(usually given at 18) is required for the draft. Since the island’s
schools do not have baseball teams, its 16- and 17-year-olds had
nowhere to train. As a result, the number of Puerto Rican MLB
signings fell by 13% in 1991–92.78
Figure 1 - Reproduced from The Economist
Substituted for Puerto Rico and Cuba was the Dominican Repub-
lic and, secondarily, Venezuela. Separate protocols or agreements
were negotiated with Japan, Korea, and, less noticed (because it is
77. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 259.
78. Baseball in Latin America: Draft Dodgers No More, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2012, at 40,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21546064.
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football, or soccer, crazy), Mexico. The new recruiting grounds were
initially a real cost-saver. For instance, Pedro Martı´nez received a
$6,500 bonus compared to the incredible but hardly comparable Mike
Mussina’s $225,000.79 Shortstop Troy Tulowitzki of Colorado got $2.3
million as opposed to the mere $23,000 that the Boston Red Sox paid
for Hanley Ramı´rez.80 And so it goes: “The average signing bonus for
American players drafted in 2011 was $232,000; for international play-
ers, it was approximately half that.”81 The philosophy, furthered by
the COMPETE Act of 2006, which made it easier to obtain visas for
minor league players from abroad during the Bush administration,82
meant that as of 2012 42% of minor leaguers were from Latin Ameri-
can countries and almost 29% of major leaguers were born there as
well, the highest percentage ever except for 2005.83
The Dominican Republic, to which baseball came in the late-
1800s presumably through Cuban immigrants, became the primary
ground of recruitment, with clubs utilizing so-called “academies” and
training camps where players could be signed at the age of sixteen
rather than the age of eighteen as is the case in the United States.84
Clubs were “parachuting in to look for big-time talent at bargain base-
ment prices. As former Colorado Rockies executive Dick Balderson
once explained, ‘Instead of signing four American guys at $25,000
each, you sign 20 Dominican guys for $5,000 each.’”85
This meant that players had less of a chance to advance to profes-
sional baseball than their American counterparts and approximately
20% the chance of getting to the majors.
79. Ian Gordon, Played, MOTHER JONES, March/April 2013, at 44.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 109-463, 120 Stat. 3477 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (2006)); see
also Joel Millman, Foreign Talent Loads the Bases in Minor Leagues, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 15,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124966930911615069.
83. Gordon, supra note 79; GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 248.
84. Michael S. Schmidt, Baseball Considers Plan to Curtail Age Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/sports/baseball/10baseball.html?_r=0;
GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 257.
85. Gordon, supra note 79.
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Figure 2 - Reproduced from Mother Jones
As time went on, however, bonuses began to increase, rising from
$29,000 for the Dominican Republic to $108,000.86 Meanwhile, secon-
darily, organized baseball began to lose out in the court of public
opinion when abuses emerged. Not all of the academies had certified
trainers.87 A 2009 Sandy Alderson report advocated changes aimed at
diminishing the steroid problem in the Dominican Republic88—as
86. Baseball in Latin America: Draft Dodgers No More, supra note 78.
87. Gordon, supra note 79, at 43.
88. Memorandum from Sandy Alderson for Bud Selig, Commissioner of Major
League Baseball 9–10 (Sept. 23, 2009) (on file with University of San Francisco Law Re-
view) [hereinafter Alderson Report]; see also ARTURO J. MARCANO & DAVID P. FIDLER, STEAL-
ING LIVES: THE GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL AND THE TRAGIC STORY OF ALEXIS QUIROZ 51
(2002); Arturo J. Marcano Guevara & David P. Fidler, Fighting Baseball Doping in Latin
America: A Critical Analysis of Major League Baseball’s Drug Prevention and Treatment Program in
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV 107, 120–26 (2007);
Arturo J. Marcano & David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Baseball: Major League Baseball and
the Mistreatment of Latin American Baseball Talent, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 511, 542–47
(1999) (examining the less than favorable treatment of players at baseball academies);
Arturo J. Marcano & David P. Fidler, Global Baseball: Latin America, in THE CAMBRIDGE COM-
PANION TO BASEBALL (Leonard Cassuto ed., 2011).
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well as age and identity fraud89—providing for three-year contracts so
that teams could recoup their losses if they had been misled in signing
what they perceived to be a younger player.90 The regulation of the so-
called “buscones,” the recruiters who feed these players to the clubs
and their academies, was sought as well. The biggest development is
the 2011 collective bargaining agreement, which limits the salaries of
both draftees as well as international players and provides for substan-
tial tax and draft disallowance sanctions for violations. The collective
bargaining agreement provides that these sanctions grow more severe
in both the fines and the draft losses and thus a kind of poison pill in
the event that the negotiation of an international draft is not—and it
was not—achieved by June 1, 2013.
It remains to be seen, but these changes may diminish academy
abuses and perhaps, as in Puerto Rico, the recruitment of Latin Amer-
ican players as well. The question of whether American players, black
or white, will obtain more job opportunities remains a matter of con-
jecture. The principle thrust of the 2011 agreement was to fashion a
quid pro quo for expanding free agency for major league players91 in
exchange for wage constraints for those entering the market. Like
draftees who are the subject of rookie wage scales in basketball and
football, they are, of course, unrepresented.92 Undoubtedly these pro-
visions are an attempt to not only move away from both academy
abuses and escalating Latin American draft bonuses but also are de-
vised in anticipation of the inevitable diminution of extant Cold War
89. For instance, Fausto Carmona of the Cleveland Indians was revealed to be playing
under a false identity, having been born Roberto Herna´ndez. Subsequently, he assumed
his real identity with the Tampa Bay Rays. Joe Smith, Hernandez Evoking the Carmona of Old,
TAMPA BAY TIMES, March 11, 2013, at 1C, available at http://www.tampabay.com/sports/
baseball/rays/rays-roberto-hernandez-looking-like-same-old-pitcher-under-new-name/
2108356.
90. Alderson Report, supra note 88, at 6–7.
91. The 2011 collective bargaining agreement substantially modified the rules for free
agent compensation by eliminating the Type A and Type B free agent designations (for-
mer Type C designations were eliminated in an earlier collective bargaining agreement)
for determining compensation and replacing them with a uniform system based on qualify-
ing offers. See MLB-MLBPA 2012–2016 BASIC AGREEMENT 87–88 (2011) [hereinafter BASIC
AGREEMENT]; Matthew Leach, As Expected, New Rules Impact Free-Agent Market, MLB (Feb. 12,
2013), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20130212&content_id=41560238&
c_id=mlb. If a team makes one of its players who is becoming a free agent a qualifying offer
(equal to the average salary of the 125 highest paid players), the free agent declines the
offer, and the free agent is signed by another team, then the team losing the free agent is
entitled to a compensatory draft pick. Leach, supra.
92. See generally Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (involving
antitrust action brought by college basketball players challenging certain provisions of col-
lective bargaining agreement with the NBA).
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barriers vis-a`-vis Cuba. MLB knows that a gold rush could be on once
Helms-Burton is modified and the potential for a draft system may
well head off what would otherwise be a relatively expensive free
agency scramble.
The first and most prominent of the country-specific arrange-
ments involves Japan.93 The Japanese protocol arrangement grew out
of the Los Angeles Dodgers’s signing of Nomo in the 1990s as well as a
dispute relating to Japanese pitcher Hideki Irabu, who was the subject
of an attempted exclusive working agreement between the San Diego
Padres and Chiba Lotte Mariners.94 After it was clear that he wanted
to play in the United States, Irabu was assigned to the Padres but he
resisted this transaction.
The MLBPA threatened legal and arbitral action if the Padres did
not trade Irabu’s negotiating rights to the team of his choice. The
MLB Players Relation Committee questioned the authority of the
MLBPA to file a grievance on Irabu’s behalf. The Committee main-
tained that the MLBPA could not properly represent a Japanese
player who was not already part of the bargaining unit composed
of major league players.95
But the fact is that not only is the Rule 4 amateur draft system part of
the collective bargaining agreement, but also the draft has served as
compensation for major league free agents, a compensation, as noted
above, considerably diminished by the 2011 agreement.96 Earlier rul-
ings by both the courts and arbitrators supported the idea that
MLBPA could act on behalf of applicant players as well as incumbents
inasmuch as unilateral changes could undermine or affect the incum-
bent player’s benefit protected by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.97 Noting that bargaining historically sometimes involved
amateur matters and sometimes did not, the arbitrator was of the view
that the parties had routinely recognized the promotion of players to
the majors and the demotion of players to the minors.98 Moreover,
the arbitrator concluded that the right to challenge changes in the
amateur draft had not been waived by the MLBPA in collective bar-
93. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 268–72; see also Gould, Global-
ization in Collective Bargaining, supra note 53.
94. See GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 262–63.
95. Id. at 263.
96. See Alderson Report, supra note 88, at 8–9.
97. See Major League Baseball Players’ Association and the Twenty-eight Major
League Clubs (Amateur draft) (Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with author); BASIC AGREEMENT,
supra note 91, at 1–2.
98. William B. Gould IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard and
Watched ‘Round the World (With Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J. GLOBAL & L.
STUD. 85, 111 (2000) [hereinafter Gould, Baseball and Globalization].
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gaining.99 Further, the arbitrator believed that the changes in the case
before him were significant because they assigned a college-bound
player to a club for five years and eliminated the pressure to sign a
player upon pain of losing him during the following year.100 As a prac-
tical matter, the opportunity to improve his position in succeeding
drafts was foreclosed. Subsequent arbitral decisions confirmed this
reasoning.101
Although these baseball arbitration cases avoided the question of
whether the duty to bargain about hiring decisions was a mandatory
subject of bargaining within the meaning of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,102 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that
the basketball draft and salary cap were not “the product solely of an
agreement among horizontal competitors but [rather was] embodied
in a collective agreement between an employer or employers and a
labor organization reached through procedures mandated by federal
labor legislation.”103 Accordingly, the court reasoned that federal la-
bor policy precluded a player from obtaining his true market value
through antitrust litigation simply because he was dissatisfied with his
salary.104 Analogizing to collective negotiations between labor and
management in construction, maritime, and other industries,105 the
court stated:
The choice of employer is governed by the rules of the hiring hall,
not the preference of the individual worker. There is nothing that
prevents such agreements from providing that the employee either
work for the designated employer at the stipulated wage or not be
referred at that time. Otherwise, a union might find it difficult to
provide the requisite number of workers to employers. Such an




101. See Major League Baseball Players’ Association and the Twenty-eight Major
League Clubs (Amateur draft) (June 10, 1993) (on file with author); Major League Base-
ball Players’ Association and the Thirty Major League Clubs (May 18, 1998) (on file with
author).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); cf. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
(holding that bargaining may be divided into mandatory and non-mandatory or permissive
subjects and establishing different rules for each).
103. Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
104. Id. at 960–61.
105. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors (Houston AGC), 143 N.L.R.B. 409
(1963), enf’d, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965) (deciding the question of whether the hiring
hall is a mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act).
106. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
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  “The court noted that ‘newcomers’ like Wood, who sought to bar-
gain as a rookie free of both cap and draft status which limited him to
one team, are frequently disadvantaged in collective bargaining rela-
tionships primarily because they lack seniority.”107 Judge Winter’s
opinion for the Second Circuit rejected the argument that individuals
who were not current members of the bargaining unit could not be
regulated by collective bargaining agreements and noted that the
NLRA “explicitly defines ‘employee’ in a way that includes workers
outside the bargaining unit.”108 “Accordingly, the court brought ‘po-
tential employees’ and current employees within the purview of the
labor exemption immunity to antitrust liability established [in this
case].”109
Moreover, the NLRB, during my chairmanship in the 1990s, held
that an employer is obliged to provide the union with information
about applicants where there was possible discrimination in the work-
place as evidenced by the parties’ inclusion of a no-discrimination
clause in the collective bargaining agreement, so that it may discharge
its duty as collective bargaining representative under some circum-
stances.110 Subsequently, in the 1994 baseball strike, the Second Cir-
cuit again reasoned:
A mix of free agency and reserve clauses combined with other pro-
visions is the universal method by which leagues and player unions
set individual salaries in professional sports. Free agency for vet-
eran players may thus be combined with a reserve system, as in
baseball, or a rookie draft, as in basketball, for newer players. . . .
To hold that any of these items, or others that make up the mix in
a particular sport, is merely a permissive subject of bargaining
would ignore the reality of collective bargaining in sports.111
These authorities, along with potential antitrust liability, un-
doubtedly convinced MLB to support the proposition that a trade
could and should send Irabu to the team of his choosing, the New
York Yankees, where to the regret of both Irabu and the Yankees, he
did not flourish.
“In the wake of the Irabu matter, baseball has negotiated agree-
ments with commissioners’ offices of baseball in Japan and Korea.
These agreements do not include the MLBPA or the Japanese players’
107. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 263.
108. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
109. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 263.
110. Hertz Corp., 319 N.L.R.B 180 (1995), enf. denied, Hertz Corp. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d
868 (3d Cir. 1997); cf. NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 18 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1994).
111. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm. (Silverman I), 67 F.3d
1054, 1061–62 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
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union as a party to them.”112 One potential consequence of this is to
presumably make unavailable the so-called non-statutory labor exemp-
tion to antitrust law, which has played such a major role in sports
generally.113
Though baseball historically—beginning with the landmark deci-
sion in Federal Baseball Club v. National League,114 authored by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes—was deemed to have an antitrust exemption,
the Curt Flood Act of 1998 has partially reversed that authority insofar
as major league employment relations are concerned. Given the previ-
ously noted treatment of applicants in the form of draftees as well as
international signings, the subject matter would seem to involve major
league relations and thus fall within the Curt Flood Act’s reversal of
the seventy-six years of baseball antitrust jurisprudence.115 But the
1998 statute also states that the labor exemption shields baseball own-
ers, as it does the owners of football, basketball, and hockey, unless
the union has disappeared or is moribund—this is what has prompted
a number of the sports unions to threaten decertification and disaffili-
ation116—and the Major League Baseball Players Association is cer-
tainly alive and well! Does the Supreme Court precedent of Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.,117 now made applicable to baseball by virtue of the
Curt Flood Act, allow for the elimination of the non-statutory labor
exemption where the subject matter in question has not been bar-
gained by the union, the union is not a signatory to the agreement in
question, and yet the subject would be, if the union raised it, a
mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of the Act?118
112. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 268.
113. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611–13 (8th Cir. 1976); Robert-
son v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1977); Powell v. Nat’l Football
League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1308 (8th Cir. 1989); McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp.
871, 882–83 (D. Minn. 1992).
114. 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972); STUART
BANNER, THE BASEBALL TRUST: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 91 (2013).
115. The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998); BANNER,
supra note 114, at 246–47; GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 265.
116. See, e.g., McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 886; Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp.
226, 235 (D. Minn. 1992); White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1408 (D.
Minn. 1993); cf. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2011) (avoiding the
issue, given the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 pre-
cluded the issue of an injunction against the NFL’s lockout regardless of the disaffiliation
or decertification issue).
117. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
118. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (holding that applicants are
employees within the meaning of the Act); Hertz Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 180 (1995), enf.
denied, Hertz Corp. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 868 (3d Cir. 1997); cf. Bd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); see generally Gould, Baseball and Globalization, supra note 98
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The protocol between the Japanese and American baseball sys-
tems applies to major league players within the Japanese reserve sys-
tem, although a dispute has already emerged in connection with the
Boston Red Sox signing of Junichi Tazawa from the Industrial League
in Japan as to whether such players are governed by the system. The
Japanese claimed that such players (Tazawa played for Nippon Oil)
are really off-limits to the Americans as a result of a “gentlemen’s
agreement.”119 (The San Diego Padres created controversy by signing
an eighteen-year-old Japanese pitcher prior to his graduation from
high school!)
In Japan, only a player who has played for nine years is a free
agent and can be recruited and signed by Major League Baseball at
that time,120 just as players in the United States, ever since the 1976
collective bargaining agreement, are free agents at the end of six years
of major league service.121 The protocol applies to Japanese players
prior to their nine-year period.
If an MLB club wishes to engage a Japanese player who has “played
baseball in Japan and/or is under contract with a Japanese club,”
the club must request that the MLB Commissioner determine the
status and availability of the Japanese player in the same manner
that the status and availability of the MLB player is determined. If
no approval is needed, the club immediately contacts the Japanese
player. If approval is needed, that contact can be initiated only
(discussing how labor-management relations in the MLB has created controversies in U.S
antitrust and labor law that are inseparable from the global and domestic growth of the
MLB). The issue of retirees is also relevant. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (holding that retirees are not employees within
the meaning of the Act; therefore, employers are not obliged to bargain about their condi-
tions); Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 1977) (“When a Union
elects to undertak[e bargaining over retiree benefits], the union’s duty of fair representa-
tion must apply.”); Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69, 72 (9th Cir. 1975) (similar holding).
But see United Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1486 n.16 (1983) (suggesting that
the duty of fair representation should not extend to retirees, even when the union acts in
ways that affect retiree interests); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 727 F.2d 177,
183 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the duty of fair representation does not apply to contract
administration on behalf of retirees); Eller v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 872 F.
Supp. 2d 823, 833–34 (D. Minn. 2012) (dismissing retirees’ claims against NFLPA because
of the lack of a fiduciary duty). Conditions involving retirees as they relate to active incum-
bent employees are a mandatory subject of bargaining. See S. Nuclear Operating Co. v.
NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247,
250–51 (7th Cir. 1948).
119. See Alan Schwarz & Brad Lefton, Japanese Are Irked by U.S. Interest in Pitcher, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at B12.
120. Japan Tries to Discourage Amateurs from Playing in MLB with Ban, ESPN (Oct. 8,
2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3632083; GOULD, BARGAINING WITH
BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 268.
121. BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 91, at 86.
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when the club has provided approval. Similar provisions are pro-
vided in the Korean agreement, which was entered into in 1996.122
  All of these procedures were brought into play by the Irabu matter
and the fear on the part of American baseball that litigation—perhaps
raising antitrust issues protecting a boycott of Japanese players under
the Curt Flood Act—would ensue in the absence of new mechanisms.
The attempt is to address those Japanese players who have reached an
advanced stage in moving toward free agency and thus provide an
early exit for them with compensation for the Japanese team. In a way,
this is a rough analogue to the way in which American clubs may treat
American players who are about to obtain free agency and are traded
away by their clubs so that the latter can obtain some compensation
for them beyond what they would be entitled to under the collective
bargaining agreement when the player has obtained free agent status.
With regard to those players for whom approval is required, e.g.,
those who have not reached the end of their nine-year service period,
the MLB Commissioner posts the Japanese player’s availability by
notifying
all U.S. Major League Clubs of the Japanese clubs to make the
player available. Requests for Japanese club postings are made
from November 1 to March 1. Within four business days of the
posting all interested MLB clubs are required to submit a bid to
the MLB Commissioner composed of monetary consideration only,
to be paid to the Japanese Club as consideration for the Japanese
Club relinquishing its rights to the player in the event that the U.S.
Club reaches an agreement with the Japanese player. The MLB
Commissioner determines the highest bidder and that determina-
tion is ‘conclusive and binding on all parties. The Japanese com-
missioner must then determine whether the bid is acceptable to
the Japanese club. If it is not acceptable, then no contract may be
had with the player until the next window period. If the highest bid
is acceptable, the MLB Commissioner is to award the sole, exclu-
sive and non-assignable right to negotiate with and sign the Japa-
nese player. If the MLB team cannot come to terms with the player
within thirty days from the date that the MLB Commissioner indi-
cates that the bid is acceptable to the Japanese club, the obligation
to compensate lapses, as do the negotiation rights of the club, and
no contract may be had with the player until the following window
period.123
Both the original Japanese and Korean agreements have since ex-
pired, but by their terms are automatically renewed each year unless
122. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 268.
123. Id. at 269 (internal citations omitted).
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either league objects in advance.124 Why were they entered into in the
first instance and why might their renewal potentially come under de-
bate? In the first place, the idea was to avoid future litigation of the
kind described previously. In the second place, as more Japanese play-
ers are recruited, there will always be eighteen MLB clubs which are
displeased by virtue of any exclusive or preferential working agree-
ments. This is because there are thirty MLB teams and only twelve
Japanese teams. Thus, access for all MLB clubs to Japanese players
became an important principle.
Third, the approval mechanisms were included so that Japanese
sensibilities about MLB baseball imperialism would not be ignored.125
The Japanese do not want to see their own professional league be-
come a farm system for MLB and to see their best teams raided for top
talent, a concern shared by the Koreans and one that is sure to be
manifested by the Cubans who have a well-established league of their
own. “As noted above, this problem has become more considerable as
attendance and TV ratings in Japan have dropped. The problem of
American baseball imperialism remains an important one.”126 And
since 1999, when the Japanese system went into effect, twenty-two Jap-
anese players127 have been posted through the system and only one
Korean, the Dodger lefty Ryu Hyun-jin.
The same holds true for other nations that may fear talent deple-
tion because of an MLB international draft. Thus, Japan and other
124. E-mail from Joe Garagiola, Jr. to the author (Apr. 3, 2013, 18:00:52 PST) (on file
with author); cf. Ben Badler, Teams Keeping Close Watch on Japan’s Tanaka, BASEBALL
AMERICA, Sep. 17–Oct.1, 2013, at 18 (on file with author) (detailing that Japan’s Tanaka is
being closely watched even though there may be changes to MLB’s posting system that
could affect his future).
125. American baseball has not always been concerned with this problem. See generally
ROBERT ELIAS, THE EMPIRE STRIKES OUT: HOW BASEBALL SOLD U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
PROMOTED THE AMERICAN WAY ABROAD (2010) (providing an examination of baseball’s his-
toric relationship with American’s foreign policy).
126. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 269.
127. There have been thirteen successful postings from Japan through which players
from the Japanese league were acquired by American teams. Brad Lefton, Focus on a Star
and a System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/10/sports/baseball/yu-darvish-situation-puts-spotlight-on-japanese-player-posting-sys-
tem.html?_r=0#. The players with the four highest winning bids have been Yu Darvish in
2011 ($51.7 million from the Texas Rangers), Daisuke Matsuzaka in 2006 ($51.1 million
from the Boston Red Sox), Kei Igawa in 2006 ($26.0 million from the New York Yankees),
and Ichiro Suzuki in 2000 ($13.1 million from the Seattle Mariners). Id. There have been
nine unsuccessful postings from Japan, including seven players who did not draw any bids
from American teams. Id. The Athletics won exclusive negotiating rights to pitcher Hisashi
Iwakuma in 2010 and the Yankees to infielder Hiroyuki Nakajima in 2011, but in both
cases the team and player failed to reach an agreement in the allotted time. Id.
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countries have an interest in restraining and regulating the future
Irabu disputes. But there are many problems with this arrangement.
The nonassignability of the rights obtained by the highest bidder is
presumably designed to avoid another Irabu situation in which the
Yankees were waiting in the wings to receive Irabu’s assigned negotiat-
ing rights. But teams like the Yankees, Red Sox (it was the Red Sox,
after all, which provided the record-breaking $51 million purchase
price for Seibu’s Daisuke Matsuzaka)128 and other high rollers will still
benefit from the post-Irabu mechanism because they are most likely to
be the highest bidder for the players that are perceived to be of pre-
mium quality. This is particularly true given the fact that only mone-
tary compensation may be provided.129
After the highest bidder wins, the negotiating rights lapse if no
arrangement is reached with the player within thirty days. Some teams
may want to keep the player off the market and to provide the highest
bid, knowing that their bargaining stance makes a contract with the
player impossible since no dispute resolution mechanism such as arbi-
tration is contained in the agreement. It is unclear how this and other
potential abuses by teams can be adjudicated.
Another problem with the current system is that bidding and po-
tential bargaining are not transparent. Teams are bidding in the dark,
i.e., they do not know what the other teams are offering. In the case of
the Red Sox bid of $51 million for Matsuzaka, the next-highest bid,
put forward by the New York Mets, was almost $20 million less.130 The
Red Sox undoubtedly thought the New York Yankees would come
much closer (the Yankees were reputed to have offered $33 million).
The Americans want the system to be one of open-bidding so that the
Japanese teams do not get a windfall, and obviously the Japanese resist
this for the very same reasons that the Americans want it. Another
related point is the view of the Americans that it is difficult to sign
such players because of the high bid which goes to the Japanese team.
MLB has proposed that the players get more, perhaps assuming that
the teams are an obstacle to both negotiations and thus make the sys-
128. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 269.
129. In my view, the transaction arrangements, other than those providing for mone-
tary compensation exclusively, should be part of the system. It is unclear why a trade be-
tween the two countries cannot be arranged unless the Commissioners thought that an
agreement could not be negotiated with the players. The promotion of trades across na-
tional boundaries will lend more credibility to foreign leagues, such as those in Japan, and
promote and enhance foreign baseball, which will lead to a genuine World Series between
clubs, as well as national teams, at some point in the future.
130. ROGER D. BLAIR, SPORTS ECONOMICS 399 (2012).
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tem more inflexible—but, of course, the Japanese teams obviously are
of a different view.
The Japanese players’ union—while the players’ value is dimin-
ished by the bidding process that gives everything to the clubs and
therefore inhibits the amount of future bargaining that will go to the
player—has thus far said little to express dissatisfaction. As a result, as
the Japan Times noted, “[p]layers currently have little leverage and are
essentially held hostage by the process.”131 Said the Times:
Japanese teams have to not only first agree to post a player, but
then also deem the posting fee acceptable. The Yomiuri Giants’
Koji Uehara [now with the Boston Red Sox], the Hanshin Tigers’
Kyuji Fujikawa and the Seibu Lions’ Hiroyuki Nakajima all hit the
wall in this regard in past seasons. That trio was eventually forced
to wait out the nine-year service time requirement needed to reach
international free agency.132
Presumably, the American Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion is not terribly concerned about this process given the fact that the
union is not fundamentally responsive to applicants who are Japanese
players. We have seen that the union has willingly negotiated severe
de facto caps in the form of monetary and draft-loss sanctions relating
to draftees in the 2011 agreement, though in the latter instance this
was bargained-for enhanced free agent leverage.133
Japan and Korea have established leagues, thus the previously
noted agreements. Similarly, Mexico has an established league about
which it is alleged that Major League Baseball has a “cozy, lucrative,
and exclusive relationship.”134 It is said that some of the Mexican
teams arrange to have a commission from signings with American
teams even though they have not played for the former and are not
under contract with them.135 Cuba has perhaps the most prestigious
although defector-marked league system, which thus far has had no
relations with the United States because of the embargo initiated by
President Eisenhower and President Kennedy and now solidified by
the Helms-Burton Act of 1996.136 Perhaps it is Cuba as much as the
previously described problems in Latin America, particularly the Do-
131. Jason Coskrey, NPB Players Should Speak out About Posting System, JAPAN TIMES (Dec.
4, 2012), available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2012/12/04/baseball/npb-play-
ers-should-speak-out-about-posting-system/#.UlWY1WT5kqo.
132. Id.
133. BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 91, at 213.
134. Id.
135. Complaint at 12–13, Camacho v. Major League Baseball, No. 12-CV-2859L, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171298 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012).
136. Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91 (2006)).
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minican Republic, which has induced Major League Baseball to take
the next step in a process long discussed and debated, e.g., an interna-
tional draft system. The Cuban free agents, beginning with Orlando
Hernandez or El Duque,137 have negotiated successful free agent
agreements subsequent to establishing residence in other countries so
as to escape draft coverage that would limit their bargaining.138
III. The International Draft
The idea of an international draft is of long standing: formerly
advocated by a so-called “blue ribbon panel” which was created by
baseball—the union or no other independent party had any represen-
tation—and the reason was the same one behind the institution of the
Rule 4 amateur draft in 1965, i.e., to stop the clubs bidding with one
another for valuable talent. From the beginning, however, this objec-
tive was something that baseball approached with some caution given
the earlier-described economic benefits involved in signing young
boys at the age of sixteen who came out of academies in the Domini-
can Republic. In the 2006 collective bargaining agreement, a commit-
tee had been established to consider the implementation of the
international draft, but the draft did not materialize.
Again in the 2011 collective bargaining agreement, a more exten-
sive so-called “international talent committee” contractual provision
was negotiated “to discuss the development and acquisition of interna-
tional players, including the potential inclusion of international ama-
teur players in a draft, and to examine the rules and procedures
pursuant to which international professional players sign contracts
with Clubs.”139 The committee was charged with advising both the
Players Association and the Office of the Commissioner on (1) “if
there is an international draft, whether international players should
be part of a single worldwide draft (including players currently cov-
ered by the Rule 4 draft), or a separate draft (or drafts)”; (2) the age
for signing such international players; and (3) the status of Puerto
Rico in the event that there is more than one draft.140 Other matters
to be addressed are appropriate country-by-country plans (including
the revision of plans in Mexico, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, and “[h]ow
137. See generally STEVE FAINARU & RAY SA´NCHEZ, THE DUKE OF HAVANA: BASEBALL, CUBA,
AND THE SEARCH FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM (2001) (providing an in-depth background on
El Duque).
138. See, e.g., Champion & Norris, supra note 66; Frankel, supra note 66.
139. BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 91, at 265.
140. Id.
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Cuban players should be treated in an amateur talent system in light
of the legal-political factors that affect their signability”),141 the estab-
lishment of a league in the Dominican Republic,142 problems relating
to representation or in the Dominican Republic the so-called bus-
cones,143 and the programs in the international academies.144
Since the negotiation of the agreement in early 2012, Bud Selig
has called the international draft “inevitable.”145 There are built-in
motivations. As we have seen, Latin American bonuses, particularly in
the Dominican Republic, have been inferior to those obtained by
American players. But they are now on the move upward and it may
be that a draft would be the best way to retard this development.
Moreover, this might assist MLB in addressing age and identity fraud,
performance-enhancing drug use—dramatized by the documentary
Sugar146—and abuses including bonus-skimming by agents (or bus-
cones) as well as Americans who work with them.
Problems abound. Many clubs may see their investment in the
academies diminished by virtue of the draft. There remains the ques-
tion of what to do with the established leagues. And an abandonment
of the country-by-country program would make MLB vulnerable to
charges of more naked imperialism.
But the elephant in the room is Cuba where, along with the
Dominicans, lies the finest talent in the world.147 Initially confronting
the defectors two decades ago, baseball devised a number of drafts for
them. Beginning with Orlando Herna´ndez, who signed with the New
York Yankees in 1998,148 players began to establish residence else-
141. Id. at 266.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 265–66.
145. Josh Leventhal, Selig Calls International Draft “Inevitable,” BASEBALL AMERICA (Feb.
23, 2012), http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/majors/news/2012/2613020.html.
146. SUGAR (Sony Pictures 2008).
147. Badler, MLB Delays Cuban Signings, supra note 66; cf. Badler, Slugging First Baseman
Abreu Leaves Cuba, supra note 66; Shereen Marison Meraji, Cuban Defector Yasiel Puig Ignites
Los Angeles Dodgers, NPR (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/09/24/225659451/
profile-of-dodgers-yasiel-puig; Leventhal, supra note 145 (explaining despite the inevitabil-
ity of an international draft, Latin American teams may still face difficulties).
148. See FAINARU & SA´NCHEZ, supra note 137, at 66–68, 99. The first Cuban players to
defect in the early 1990s were dealt with on a relatively ad hoc basis. In 1991, pitcher Rene´
Arocha defected and MLB arranged a special, one-player lottery for teams to bid on the
right to negotiate with him. In the following years, special lotteries were organized for
small groups of Cuban defectors, including future New York Mets shortstop Rey Ordo´n˜ez
in 1993. Yet, in 1995, top pitching prospect Ariel Prieto defected and was held eligible for
the June amateur draft; he was selected fifth overall in the 1995 draft by the Oakland
Athletics. This ad hoc system was phased out of existence after agent Joe Cubas began
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where and thus acquire free agent status. It is to this phenomenon
that the draft is aimed, as well as in anticipation of the death of Fidel
Castro and a new arrangement with Cuba. Thus the collective bargain-
ing agreement creates an incentive, i.e., if there is no draft agreement
by June 1 of this year for the 2014 season, new sanctions for violation
of the salary caps will be put in place, including an increased tax on
“pool overage” and more severe bonus restrictions.149
If an international draft is put into effect, antitrust law would be
applicable150 as is the case with the national draft.151 The fact that the
union is signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, and that the
agreement as well as the system is bargained, brings into play the non-
statutory labor exemption which should immunize the agreement
from attack in this country, so long as a collective bargaining relation-
ship exists.152
But, as in connection with the basketball and hockey labor dis-
putes discussed ante, frequently the question is which country’s law
applies and one of the matters which the committee is to consider
relates to the “laws of the countries from which international players
are signed and how those laws should affect the actions of the par-
ties.”153 In examining some of the precedent on this subject, it may be
useful to consider the most vivid and recent illustration of baseball
globalization, the World Baseball Classic.
IV. World Baseball Classic
In the wake of the Olympics’ 2005 decision to drop baseball,154 a
calculated decision was made based upon the idea that there is a
greater prospect for major league players in the United States to par-
exploiting the loophole of having his client defectors establish residency outside of the
United States, which allowed pitchers Osvaldo Ferna´ndez and Liva´n Herna´ndez (future
All-Star and half-brother of Orlando Herna´ndez) to sign lucrative contracts as free agents
in 1996. See Frankel, supra note 66, at 395–99; Champion & Norris, supra note 66, at
221–22.
149. Ben Badler, Nine Questions MLB Must Address for an International Draft, BASEBALL
AMERICA (May 28, 2013), http://www.baseballamerica.com/international/nine-questions-
mlb-must-address-for-an-international-draft/.
150. United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105–06 (1913).
The same theme is echoed in Judge Hand’s opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
151. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing
the legality of the National Football League draft under antitrust laws).
152. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248–50 (1996).
153. BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 91, at 266.
154. Lynn Zinser, I.O.C. Drops Baseball and Softball in 2012, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/09/sports/othersports/09olympic.html; William B.
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ticipate in other kinds of competition rather than through a two-week
interruption in August every four years for the Olympics—the kind of
result which Commissioner Selig finds intolerable and which has
therefore resulted in the Olympic exclusion of baseball. While the
Olympics’ decision can be reconsidered, it seems unlikely that base-
ball will change its mind.155 Thus the World Baseball Classic (“WBC”)
is a first step toward a true World Series, the world always viewing our
characterization of the Autumn Fall Classic as insular at best and arro-
gant at worst.  More modestly, Selig has openly stated that he hopes
that there will be a true World Series between what seem to be the
countries with the greatest talent and infrastructure, the United States
and Japan.156
The WBC has now gone through three iterations, in 2006, 2009,
and 2013. With each contest the attendance as well as the profits have
increased, albeit gradually.157 The ratings in Japan and Cuba are far
beyond those in the United States,158 the finals this year in AT&T Park
in San Francisco being played to less-than-capacity crowds.159 (Curi-
ously, however, Cuba played to near-empty stadiums in Fukuoka, Ja-
pan, when Japan was not in competition with them.) Japan has won
twice, defeating once-preeminent Cuba  (hobbled as it is by the nu-
merous defections of its best talent to the United States)160 and the
Gould IV, Baseball Classic Mirrors World Events, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006, at
13A.
155. In fact, once again baseball has been excluded from the Olympics. See Jere´ Long-
man, Wrestling, with Revamped Rules, Returns to Summers Games, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 9, 2013, at
D9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/sports/olympics/wrestling-is-re-
stored-to-the-olympics.html?_r=0 (noting baseball will not be a part of the 2016 Summer
Olympics being held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).
156. J.J. Cooper, Selig: True World Series Is Eventual Goal, BASEBALL AMERICA (Mar. 8,
2013), http://www.baseballamerica.com/majors/selig-true-world-series-is-eventual-goal/.
157. Mike Berardino, Despite Successes, World Baseball Classic Still Finding Its Footing, BASE-
BALL AMERICA (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.baseballamerica.com/international/despite-
successes-world-baseball-classic-still-finding-its-footing-14790/.
158. Id.
159. Bill Shaikin, Is WBC a Success Despite Poor Attendance for Final Round?, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/19/sports/la-sp-sn-wbc-attend-
ance-bud-selig-20130319.
160. By some counts, there have been at least 240 Cuban baseball players that have
defected to the U.S. over the last few decades. Complete List of Known Cuban Baseball Defec-
tors, CUBAN BALL (2012), http://www.cubanball.com/Images/History/RedBall/Defect/
Defect.pdf. This includes at least thirty former members of the Cuban national team. List of
Cuban Defectors, BASEBALL REFERENCE (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.baseball-reference.com/
bullpen/List_of_Cuban_Defectors. Of course, Cuba is the only team that has lost its play-
ers to Major League Baseball; the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Japan,
Korea, and even the Netherlands are playing with some major leaguers.  This is because
the defecting Cubans cannot return to Cuba. See, e.g., 2013 Baseball Roster for WBC Participat-
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Republic of South Korea has been a strong competitor. The third
championship, in 2013, went to the Dominican Republic, defeating
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which had two days earlier upset
Japan.161 The level of play, particularly in the finals in San Francisco,
was excellent if not exquisite. Rarely will one be able to see Robinson
Cano´, Jose´ Reyes, and Carlos Santana playing on the same team, with
Cano´ ranging far to his left making the difficult look easy, as did Reyes
with his quick hands at short. On the other hand, the United States
has never advanced beyond the semifinals and the participation of
players signed to major league contracts has been uneven at best be-
cause of the fear of injury by the clubs, and subtle discouragement
(explicit prohibitions are not permitted) by the clubs of the players.
In fact, it is said that studies show that players who play in the
WBC from Major League Baseball are less likely to be on the disabled
list than those who do not.162 But timing is a problem for the WBC in
a number of respects. For the United States, the games are played in
February and March when Spring Training commences and where ex-
hibitions in Florida and Arizona are not played competitively. Cuba,
on the other hand, is marching down the final laps of its pennant
race. But Japan is in the same seasonal situation as the United States
and the 2013 WBC champion Dominican Republic team was led by
players who were part of the American spring training system. Yet, as
noted previously, the reality is that clubs are reluctant to have their
players play, a factor which undermines competition or at least the
position of the United States.
Timing is a problem. But if not March, when? The American All-
Stars used to tour Japan in November when the weather was still de-
cent in that country (it would not be so in the United States except on
the West Coast and perhaps portions of the South). But it is difficult
to have players at their highest level at that time, particularly with the
now almost year-round regimen beginning in February and conclud-
ing after a 162-game schedule—including an All-Star Game which is
supposed to be an exhibition but which Selig has now declared other-
ing Teams, BASEBALL REFERENCE, http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/2013_
World_Baseball_Classic_(Rosters) (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
161. Dominican Republic Blanks Puerto Rico to Win WBC Championship, ESPN (Mar. 19,
2013, 8:00 PM), http://espn.go.com/extra/baseball/wbbc/recap?gameId=330319117; Jim
Caple, Puerto Rico’s Upset Upsets Japan, ESPN (Mar. 17, 2013), http://espn.go.com/mlb/
worldclassic2013/story/_/id/9064764/wbc-japan-loss-puerto-rico-gain.
162. Jayson Stark, Busting the WBC Injury Myth, JAYSON STARK BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013, 12:24
PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/blog/_/name/stark_jayson/id/8853591/busting-world-
baseball-classic-injury-myth.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\48-1\SAN101.txt unknown Seq: 34  3-JAN-14 14:41
34 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
wise by providing that its winner will have home field advantage in the
World Series163—through the end of October and now sometimes in
November itself. Another alternative is the middle of the season
around the time of and in lieu of the All-Star Game.
The fact is that the All-Star Game has been denigrated by the
strange idea (dictated by the awkward tie game of a decade ago) that
the victory determines the location of the rubber game in the World
Series. The players have never regarded the game as any more than an
exhibition and rightly so. Some of the more vivid testimony to this
proposition is the game of 2010 when Jose´ Valverde laughed and
smiled with Marlon Byrd as he attempted to show him that he would
confuse or fool him on the next pitch. This kind of thing, of course,
would never take place in true regular season competition—or a true
World Baseball Classic competition. Probably one of the best answers
would be to set aside the All-Star Game every three or four years and
allow for WBC games then. The difficulty with scheduling all of the
games in midsummer is the same problem of the Olympics, a substan-
tial gap of time which will interfere with the regular schedule, particu-
larly just as the pennant race heats up and heads into its final lap.164
Until the final four teams emerge as winners, one intermediate
position might be to play the WBC through to the final four teams
perhaps a little later in March when players are in better shape and to
postpone the final series of three games for the time when the All-Star
Game is played. This would have the games at peak midseason and
when baseball interest is at its greatest, children are out of school,
vacations are being taken, etc. In part the lackluster attendance in San
Francisco in March was attributable to Japan’s departure, and with it
the music and songs emanating from the outfield! Of course, no
team’s entry can be assured. But the identity of the finalists under the
existing system is an uncertainty, not this year resolved until the eve-
ning before the finals commenced. If the finals were scheduled for
163. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 274, 279.
164. See Joe Sheehan, Changing the World, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 18, 2013, at 27.
A move to July would also put the WBC on a stage by itself, at a relatively quiet
time on the sports calendar: pre-NFL training camps, post-NBA and NHL play-
offs. The shift wouldn’t be easy; it would require coordination with global
leagues, and a year in which the U.S. didn’t advance to the final eight—they
nearly missed last week—would present a marketing challenge. Major league
teams would have to make up the dates by playing a handful of doubleheaders,
but sacrificing two or three home dates every four years is a small price. It’s too
late for this year, of course, but a 2017 World Baseball Classic that takes center
stage at baseball’s midseason would elevate the event on and off the field.
Id.
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midsummer, people would have an opportunity to make plans around
the actual competition and even if, as seems likely, the United States is
absent, beyond baseball purists and enthusiasts, people from coun-
tries such as Japan and the Dominican Republic can make their plans
considerably before the time of the games, thus likely swelling attend-
ance, ratings, and general interest.
This is the biggest problem with international competition in
baseball—although there are others as well—American dominance
and the question of who is to be the host country. Perhaps in future
years Japan and (with political changes) Cuba could play this role.
Though baseball has been viewed as America’s national pastime,
(football’s more substantial revenues165 seem to rebut that proposi-
tion today) MLB must be careful to avoid the idea of American he-
gemony or cultural imperialism. For instance, the bracketing has been
excessively in favor of the United States, which has wound up playing
teams like Mexico, Canada, and even South Africa, and never in the
so-called killer bracket where the Dominican Republic, Venezuela,
and Puerto Rico hold sway.166 Cuba, the only country whose major
leaguers in the United States do not play for their own country team
inasmuch as they are defectors, was pushed several time zones into the
Far East in 2013 up against the highly competitive Japanese and Ko-
rean teams—although it must be noted that the Cinderella-story
Netherlands team survived both the severe competition and the jetlag
as it emerged from the difficult Far East competition itself.167
The pitch limit rules168 are designed to favor the United States
(as well as Japan and Korea) given the fact that American players (the
Japanese traditionally have had a more severe regimen) are in Spring
Training shape. Again, this disadvantages Cuba, which is in the home
stretch of its regular season.
165. Monte Burke, How the National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion in Annual Reve-
nues, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/2013/08/17/
how-the-national-football-league-can-reach-25-billion-in-annual-revenues/; MLB Revenue
Reaches $7.5 Billion, YAHOO! SPORTS (Dec. 10, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/mlb-
revenue-reaches-7-5-164013039—mlb.html.
166. See GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 274 (noting the need for
more balance in bracketing).
167. Jason Coskrey, Netherlands’ Success No Overnight Phenomenon, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 9,
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2013/03/09/baseball/netherlands-success-no-
overnight-phenomenon/#.UhKDPWT70Vk.
168. The World Baseball Classic Tournament’s Rules and Regulations, WORLD BASEBALL
CLASSIC, http://web.worldbaseballclassic.com/wbc/2013/about/rules.jsp#rules_pitcher
(last accessed Oct. 9, 2013).
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And then there is the matter of the umpires, which are now di-
vided fifty-fifty between the United States and countries abroad. This
is better than previous contests, the worst being 2006 when during a
major league umpire strike, American minor league umpires almost
caused an international incident by blowing a call involving a sacrifice
fly by concluding incorrectly that the Japanese runner had left the
base too early.169 It took Sadaharu Oh’s calming presence to circum-
vent more severe international discord.
Penultimately, because Venezuela, like Cuba, poses special diplo-
matic relations problems for the United States, it is important that the
World Baseball Classic adhere to some measure of neutrality. This was
not done for instance in 2013 at the time of Hugo Cha´vez’s death:
Cha´vez’s death produced an awkward moment for Major
League Baseball. Before Venezuela played the Miami Marlins in
Jupiter, Fla., on Tuesday, representatives of the Venezuelan team
asked for their country’s flag to be lowered and a moment of si-
lence for Cha´vez to be observed before the game. Both requests
were denied.
Major League Baseball, which runs the W.B.C., takes its cue in
such matters from the State Department. Cha´vez was no friend of
the United States.170
Other kinds of problems must be addressed as we begin to think
about a true World Series. And then as well, in that process there is
the question of law. Thus far these issues—perhaps presaged by the
apparent interest of the Toronto Blue Jays in acquiring the services of
Cuba’s Omar Linares to play in Canada where there is no embargo
and the fact that the writ of Helms-Burton does not run that far—are
presented in disputes cutting across national boundaries where
leagues are based in the United States but some of the teams are in
Canada.
V. The Law of Sports National Boundary Disputes
The law, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,171 has deemed sports leagues to be multiem-
ployer bargaining associations,172 each franchise constituting one of
the employers that is bound together for the purpose of the collective
169. GOULD, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 159.
170. Ken Belson, Venezuelans Recall Leader’s Love of Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2013, at
B12.
171. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
172. See Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 391 (1958); Evening News Ass’n, 154
N.L.R.B. 1494, 1495–97 (1965), enf’d, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967); El Cerrito Mill & Lum-
ber Co., 316 N.L.R.B. 1005, 1006 (1995).
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bargaining process in North America. Because of scheduling, com-
mon standards of employment and discipline, as well as player mobil-
ity between the teams through both free agency, trades, and releases,
the strikes173 and lockouts174 and the rules pertaining to them created
issues by virtue of collective bargaining agreements negotiated in the
United States but covering both the U.S. and Canada.175 The labor
market in sports is unique insofar as it relates to employee mobility
and interrelated issues in contrast to regular multiemployer associa-
tions.176 Thus the appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining177 generally prevails in the absence of so-called “unusual
circumstances” within the meaning of NLRB precedent.178
Disputes which cut across national boundaries involving relation-
ships between organized labor and multiemployer entities are prop-
erly characterized as so-called mixed territory cases because of the fact
that more than one country is involved. The touchstone decision re-
flecting the prevailing consensus about NLRB jurisdiction over con-
duct in two countries is California Gas Transport, Inc.179 where a
unanimous Board held that “it is appropriate to assert jurisdiction
over . . . violations which occurred in Mexico” where the “effects in
the U.S.” occur within United States borders.180 This holding, based
upon the United States Supreme Court’s 2005 reiteration of an “ef-
173. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938); NLRB v. Int’l
Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S.
404, 454 (1982).
174. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96–97 (1957); Am.
Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 307, 323 (1965); Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 299
(1967).
175. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc. (Silverman II),
880 F. Supp. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954,
961–62 (2d Cir. 1987).
176. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS AND THE NLRB— A
MEMOIR 138–41 (2000).
177. See Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 357, 399 (1966); General Motors
Corp., Cadillac Motor Car Div., 120 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1221 (1958).
178. Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958); see also, e.g., James Luterbach
Constr. Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 982 (1994) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); Chel
LaCort, 315 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1036–37 (1994); Resort Nursing Home, 340 N.L.R.B. 650, 651,
654 (2003) (implicitly approving the Chel LaCort doctrine), enf’d, 389 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir.
2004); Lexington Fire Prot. Grp., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 347, 348 n.9 (1995) (Gould, Chair-
man, concurring).
179. 347 N.L.R.B. 1314 (2006), enf’d, 507 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Gen. Dynam-
ics Land Sys., Case No. 19-RC-76743 (N.L.R.B. July 20, 2012) (distinguishing this line of
authority from the application of the statute to permanent employment abroad where as-
signments inside the United States are not present).
180. California Gas Transport, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1316 (2006).
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fects test,”181 which allowed for the assertion of jurisdiction regarding
conduct engaged in outside the United States where the effect was
considerable inside the United States, negated or substantially quali-
fied the presumption against extraterritoriality under the National La-
bor Relations Act and related statutes followed by the Court until the
early 1990s. California Gas reiterated the position of the Board taken
more than a decade ago when it asserted jurisdiction where the “main
effect of the Respondent’s actions . . . was not extraterritorial . . . [in-
asmuch as] the results of the [Employer’s] conduct were principally
felt in the United States.”182
California Gas adhered to precedent in the antitrust arena, most
particularly a landmark opinion by Judge Learned Hand for the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.183 This precedent was followed in
Supreme Court decisions relating to antitrust and other statutes,184 as
well as with regard to foreign flagships operating in U.S. waters and
the applicability of American antidiscrimination law to conduct both
in and outside of the United States.185
Similarly, the Board was following precedent involving NLRB as-
sertion of jurisdiction over employees who have engaged in protected
concerted activities while in Canada.186 In sum, a presumption against
181. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 130–31 (2005).
182. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1107 (2001), enf. denied, 365
F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2004) (involving American workers allegedly discriminated against in
violation of the Act while on temporary assignment in Canada).
183. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945); cf.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 600–01, 608 (9th Cir. 1976) (con-
cerning the application of U.S. antitrust law to activities in other countries).
184. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 779 (1993); F. Hoffman-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
185. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 142–45 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating an even broader inter-
pretation of the effects test and less focus on a requirement of explicit congressional in-
tent); see generally Todd Keithley, Note, Does the National Labor Relations Act Extend to
Americans Who Are Temporarily Abroad?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2135 (2005) (arguing the Act
applies extraterritorially to workers temporarily abroad).
186. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 336 N.L.R.B. at 1107; see also Dowd v. Longshoremen
I.L.A., 975 F.2d 779, 789 (11th Cir. 1992) (the Board asserting jurisdiction over secondary
boycott activity engaged in by Japanese unions in Japan acting in concert with their Ameri-
can counterparts); Coastal Stevedoring Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1031 (1998) (Gould, Chair-
man, dissenting). American labor law has been applied to foreign flag-ships, Int’l
Longshoremen’s Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 196 (1970), and the
Court has held that a union refusal to upload cargo shipped from the Soviet Union in
protest against the country’s invasion of Afghanistan constituted a secondary boycott viola-
tion of the Act, notwithstanding the Board’s absence of jurisdiction over either country,
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 214, 225–26 (1982).
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extraterritoriality in the United States187 has not always applied,188 un-
less the case involves only American workers permanently assigned
elsewhere.189 Both Canada and the United States have struggled with
the question of what this means when sports teams are involved in
labor disputes. For instance, the NLRB sought injunctive relief in 1981
and 1995 against Major League Baseball and its constituent teams in-
cluding the Canadian teams—at that time the Montreal Expos and
the Toronto Blue Jays—and was successful in the latter instance190 but
unsuccessful in the former.191 This decision, though arguably
prosecutorial rather than adjudicative,192 contradicted a position that
the Board took in the 1970s in soccer when bargaining practices and
procedures had not yet been established.193 In contrast, as in baseball,
jurisdiction was asserted over Canadian teams in basketball by the New
187. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (“Aramco”), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20 (1963). But see Koibel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013) (potentially reviving the Aramco
holding).
188. See Keithley, supra note 185, at 2145 (“Although it is fair to infer that Aramco pos-
ited a strict territoriality view, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have backed away from
such a strict definition of extraterritorial conduct—and for good reasons . . . .”); id. at 2149
(“Aramco’s strict presumption against extraterritoriality . . . was overtaken by the effects test.
Two years after Aramco, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of the effects test to evaluate
the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act.”); Alcoa Marine Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 1265,
1265 (1979) (holding that, notwithstanding precedent excluding permanent assignments
from American labor law coverage, national labor law nonetheless applies to a ship’s “in-
definite—even permanent—stay outside United States territorial water”); Aguayo v.
Quadretech Corp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that the reloca-
tion of facilities to Tijuana, Mexico, for antiunion reasons was unlawful even though the
relocation was to a foreign country not covered by the Act, and ordering the employer to
restore to its California facility any bargaining unit work which had been subcontracted or
relocated to Mexico, thus rescinding all agreements to subcontract work to Mexico) (foot-
note omitted). But see Koibel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–65 (potentially reviving the Aramco
holding).
189. See Computer Scis. Raytheon, 318 N.L.R.B. 966, 970–71 (1995) (holding that the
Board’s jurisdiction does not extend to cover employees of American companies working
at military bases in foreign territories); GTE Automatic Elec. Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1223
(1976) (holding that the Board’s jurisdiction does not extend to cover workers perma-
nently assigned to Iran); RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228, 228 (1973) (holding that the
Board’s jurisdiction does not extend to cover Greenland-based employees).
190. Silverman II, 880 F. Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Silverman I, 516 F. Supp. 588,
589 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
191. See Silverman I, 516 F. Supp. at 589 n.1.
192. E.g., Muffley ex rel. NLRB v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 540 (4th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the Board’s ability to seek injunctive relief under section 10(j) is
prosecutorial rather than adjudicative); Overstreet v. El Paso Disposal, 625 F.3d 844, 852
(5th Cir. 2010) (same); Osthus v. Whitesell Corp., 639 F.3d 841, 847–48 (8th Cir. 2011)
(Colloton, J., concurring) (same).
193. N. Am. Soccer League, 241 N.L.R.B. 1225, 1228–29 (1979) (holding North Ameri-
can Soccer League to be a single entity, but refusing to exert jurisdiction over the Canada-
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York City regional director.194 North of the border, the picture is
more complicated. For instance, the Ontario Labor Relations Board
in both baseball and basketball disputes involving referees has held
that, notwithstanding the right to replace in the United States,
umpires could not be dealt with in this manner in Canada.195 On the
other hand, in the hockey cases the NLRB General Counsel indicated
that case law involving temporary assignments was to be contrasted
with the permanent assignment cases, and thus demonstrated an in-
terest in jurisdiction over the NHL.196 In hockey, both the Alberta197
and British Columbia boards198 have declined to assert jurisdiction be-
cause of the “unique nature of the league structure . . . [which] can be
summarized as an interdependent joint enterprise with a common set
of rules.”199 A similar issue was pending before the Quebec Labor Re-
lations Board,200 where that Board was to address the same issue prior
based clubs on the grounds of extraterritoriality), enf’d, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980)
(declining to address the extraterritoriality issue).
194. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Case No. 2-RD-1354 (N.L.R.B. R.D. July 26, 1995) (on file
with author).
195. See Advice Memorandum: National Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, No. 2-CB-20453
(N.L.R.B. G.C. June 30, 2006) (on file with author) (holding that Canadian franchises, as
part of the multi-employer bargaining arrangement, fall within the ambit of the NLRA);
Richard Sandomir, Union Umps Make Call on Replacements, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at B12;
Clifton Brown, NBA Refs Get New Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at B18; GOULD, BARGAIN-
ING WITH BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 273.
196. In representation proceedings, the NLRB has refused to take jurisdiction over the
Canadian clubs. N. Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322–23 (1978) (Murphy,
Chairman, dissenting in part) (“I agree with the Union and would assert jurisdiction over
the Canadian clubs. . . . [T]he exercise of sound discretion compels the Board to do so.”);
N. Am. Soccer League, 241 N.L.R.B. at 1225, 1226 n.7, 1228 (holding North American Soccer
League to be a single entity, but refusing to exert jurisdiction over the Canada-based clubs
on the grounds of extraterritoriality), enf’d, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (declining to
address the extraterritoriality issue).
197. Re: Application Brought by the NHLPA, Chris Butler et al., Board File No. GE-
06474, Alberta Labour Relations Board (Oct. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Application, Chris
Butler].
198. Orca Bay Hockey Limited Partnership, [2007] B.C.L.R.B. No. B172/2007 (July 31,
2007), available at http://www.lrb.bc.ca/decisions/B172$2007.pdf. The British Columbia
Labour Relations Board declined to exercise jurisdiction because to do so would under-
mine that stability which is integral to the collective bargaining process on a multi-em-
ployer basis. See id.
199. Application, Chris Butler, supra note 197, ¶¶ 66–67.
200. Re: Application Brought by the NHLPA, Colby Armstrong et al., C.M. No. CM-
2012-4431, Commission des relations du travail (Sept. 12, 2012). The author was an expert
witness in this case as well as the British Columbia case. See John MacDonald, Note, Don’t
Cross That Line! The Case for the Extraterritorial Application of the National Labor Relations Act, 64
U. MIAMI. L. REV. 369, 380–81 (2009); William B. Gould IV, Labor Law Beyond U.S. Borders:
Does What Happens Outside of America Stay Outside of America?, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 401
(2010).
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to the resolution of the 2012–13 hockey lockout, thus mooting the
legal issues pending in that province in early 2013.
Again, the difficulty here is that whatever the persuasiveness of
the authority cited, as sports become more international some set of
rules regarding a more effective method of dispute resolution will be
required.201
Conclusion
Baseball, sparked by Jackie Robinson and his audacious bid to
break the twentieth century color bar, was important in diminishing
racial barriers in the United States, notwithstanding the unwritten
quota which limited black participation in the game to only the most
outstanding black American players until the 1970s. The game be-
came truly desegregated toward the end of the 1970s until the past
decade or two when the number of black players began to decline
appreciably. The factors for this decline are numerous, but some of
them can be effectively addressed by the NCAA by establishing parity
between athletic scholarships available in the revenue-producing
sports like football and basketball, and baseball. Major League Base-
ball itself can play a role, not only through its continued reliance
upon programs aimed at the central cities like the RBI Program, but
also by financially augmenting baseball athletic scholarships.202
Globalization has been a factor in black American decline and
has been relied upon by MLB as it pursues new markets and revenue
and labor sources, which have been more inexpensive than the Ameri-
can player pool. The globalization process is valuable in making the
game more international along with the benefits always associated
with the expansion of the talent pool. Internationalization suffered a
setback with baseball’s exclusion from the Olympics, the American
game bringing this upon itself by refusing to set aside a period of time
once every four years to compete. The World Baseball Classic is an
important first step toward a genuine World Series which may obtain
as much international recognition for the sport than would have been
the case had the Olympic route been pursued. The transnational
boundary disputes, which have emerged principally in hockey but
have affected baseball and basketball, warn us about some of the
201. See Matthew J. Mitten & Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development
of International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. REV.
269, 283, 321– 22 (2010).
202. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
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issues that are likely to arise in connection with both an international
draft, contemplated by the 2011 collective bargaining agreement, as
well as future international competition.
